The Morality Test For God

Matt McCormick has posted on a morality test for god. Very long and somewhat repetitive, but a fairly complete analysis of god, morality and the problem of evil.

Natural Evil

Jason Rosenhouse has posted on the problem of evil and evolution. Among the commentary was this significant statement:

You can't discount natural evil as the result of human sin, because natural evil long predates human sin. You can't argue that natural evil is necessary for “soul-making” (as John Hick has argued) because natural evil long predates creatures with souls. You can't argue that natural evil is necessary for humans to obtain moral knowledge (as Richard Swinburne has argued) because natural evil long predates the existence of moral agents. You might be able to tweak these arguments to account for evolution, but the fact that tweaking is necessary shows that evolution adds something to the problem.

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Just another nail in the coffin of the apologists.

The Problem Of Natural Evil

Jerry Coyne has posted on the evil of earthquakes, and more.

This situation is emotionally troubling and elicits feelings of empathy. However, as a non-theist, I at least do not have to deal with the dissonance of trying to reconcile this, and similar events, with an all-loving, all-powerful god. For you theists, good luck with that.

Is God Omnipotent?

John Loftus has posted on omnipotence and the problem of evil.

The Problem of Evil, From A Logical Perspective

Austin Cline as posted on the problem of evil, utilizing a structured logical method (apologists, eat your hearts out).

God: The Failed Hypothesis

A Sample Of Apologetic Thinking

This blogger has previously mentioned a particular local apologetics blog in examples of apologetics. Below is a comment post by one of its owners that is particulary revealing regarding the mindset of these folks (note bolded sections, with this blogger comments immediately following in parentheses):

Tim,
If you are saying that God allows a child to get cancer, then I agree, but that’s not what you originally said. What causes a child to get cancer? Physical defects in her body, maybe the environment, maybe the genes passed on by her parents. There are many physical, or material, causes for cancer, but I don’t think there is a particular person who can be blamed for directly causing a child’s cancer, and certainly blaming God seems unwarranted.

If we ask why there is disease in the world, the Christian answer is that the fall of Adam and Eve pushed humanity out of Paradise where there was no disease. We live in a fallen world where disease runs rampant and eventually kills every human being who doesn’t die some other way. This is the fault of our human ancestors, who were our representatives. (Wow, an actual Garden of Eden, where there was no disease or death -- ALL scientific evidence refutes this!!)

But why does God let us live in a world where pain and suffering occurs? It seems that we are in a moral and spiritual training ground. There is no doubt that pain brings out the best in human beings and that without pain, in this world we would be morally and spiritually stunted. So God allows suffering to grow us. Eventually God will put an end to this world, and completely renew it so that there is no pain and suffering any more. This is what Christians have to look forward to. (So, we should then be glad there is pain and suffering so that we become the best we can be?)

But back to the original question. Why pray for healing? Because God commands us to pray to him. God sometimes heals through our prayers. We don’t know what his plan is for each person, as he doesn’t reveal those details, so we work as hard as we can to alleviate pain and suffering in the world. (Why should we try to alleviate pain and suffering, as it helps us to be better people, according to the previous paragraph) No one can say whether the child’s cancer will be healed or not, but shouldn’t we try, using one of the tools God has given us, prayer? This is what Jesus did when he walked the earth, and so should we.

Just because God allows cancer doesn’t mean that he likes it. Just because God allows evil doesn’t mean he is pro-evil. He hates sin and he only allows suffering because he can bring a greater good out of it. (if God doesn't like suffering and can stop it, is this consistent with human moral understanding?)

I’m not sure if I addressed your question, so let me know if there is more to what you’re asking.

Thanks,
Bill

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What do you think? Does this conform to known reality?

The Problem of Evil

The following is from wikipedia.org:

Logical problem of evil

One example among many of a formulation of the problem of evil is often attributed to Epicurus and may be schematized as follows:

1. If an all-powerful and perfectly good god exists, then evil does not.
2. There is evil in the world.
3. Therefore, an all-powerful and perfectly good god does not exist.

Another variant is:

1. God exists.
2. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
3. A perfectly good being would want to prevent all evils.
4. An omniscient being knows every way in which evils can come into existence.
5. An omnipotent being, who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, has the power to prevent that evil from coming into existence.
6. A being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, who is able to prevent that evil from coming into existence, and who wants to do so, would prevent the existence of that evil.
7. If there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being, then no evil exists.
8. Evil exists (logical contradiction).

The following is from infidel.org:

Evidential problem of evil

Unlike the logical argument from evil, which holds that the existence of God (so defined) is logically incompatible with some known fact about evil, the evidential (or probabilistic) argument from evil contends that some known fact about evil is evidence against the existence of God. For instance, one version of the argument contends that the biological role of pain and pleasure is much more likely on naturalism than theism (e.g., Paul Draper).

Other versions of the evidential argument concede that God could have a morally sufficient reason for allowing certain evils to occur—e.g., to ensure that some greater good is achieved as a consequence of an evil. However, proponents add, God would only allow as much evil or suffering as is absolutely necessary in order to achieve greater goods. But when we look at the world around us, we find prevalent instances of apparently gratuitous evil—pointless evils from which no greater good seems to result. According to proponents, the existence of apparently gratuitous evil provides strong evidence that God (as traditionally defined) does not exist (e.g., William Rowe).

For thousands of years theologians and philosophers have developed elaborate theodicies—responses to the argument from evil which retain belief in an all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good God. According to the unknown purpose defense (UPD), God allows apparently pointless suffering for some reason that we can't comprehend. The free will defense (FWD) maintains that God has to allow the existence of some evil in order to preserve human free will (e.g., Alvin Plantinga, Robert Adams). Finally, the soul-making theodicy (SMT) contends that God allows some evil because it builds positive character in the victims or in others which outweighs the negative value of the evil itself (e.g., John Hick).

There are several problems with each of these theodicies, but I will only note the most serious ones. The UPD faces the obvious objection that if you have no idea what reason God has for allowing evil, then for all you know there is no justifiable reason at all for an all-good God to permit it. And even if the FWD and SMT were successful, they would still leave much apparently gratuitious evil unexplained. As William Rowe points out, when a fawn burns to death in a forest fire and no human being ever knows about it, this apparently unnecessary evil neither preserves human free will nor builds the character of human beings.